A mutual relation between God and the world provides a crucial distinction between panentheism and both classical theism and pantheism. Several proposals responding to Analytical Theology's challenge to distinguish panentheism from other forms of theism are considered and found inadequate. After defining mutual relation, conceptual evidence and the frequency of descriptions of panentheism that affirm a mutual relation between God and the world provide evidence that a mutual relation is crucial to distinguishing panentheism. Finally, benefits of recognizing a mutual relation (...) between God and the world as crucial to panentheism are described. (shrink)

The distinctiveness of panentheism will facilitate its future development. Further, having a clear distinctive can facilitate conversations among panentheists from diverse religious traditions by helping recognize concepts that are compatible or similar to aspects of panentheism. Finally, having a clear distinctive facilitates recognizing relations between positions that are similar to panentheism and explicit forms of panentheism. An examination of three claims about the distinctiveness of panentheism suggests that a mutual relation between God and the world aids in identifying the distinctiveness (...) of panentheism. The nature of a mutual relation, evidence that a mutual relation is important to panentheism, and describing the benefits of recognizing a mutual relation support a mutual relation as distinctive of panentheism. (shrink)

Recent criticisms of theodicies express a conflict between theoretical and practical responses to the existence of evil. Theodicies, and defenses, seek to provide a resolution to the question of why there is evil if there is God. In providing an answer, theodicies offer an explanation for evil that responds to the existence of evil in a theoretical manner. In contrast to those theoretical responses, there have been a number of responses to the existence of evil that have emphasized acting against (...) evil. These practical responses have stressed human actions to lessen the occurrence and impact of evil. Examining the criticisms of theodicies and the responses that have been made to those criticisms opens up the possibility of an interaction between theoretical and practical responses to evil. A survey of the changing understanding of divine omnipotence demonstrates the reciprocal interaction between theoretical and practical responses to evil leading to a more a comprehensive response to the existence of evil and God’s relationship to evil. (shrink)

The absence of clear definitions for both “evangelical” and “process” theology opens the way for dialogue. The dialogue can be expanded beyond past dialogues and previous types of relationship. Two essays in this section propose creative conceptualities of God’s relationship to the world that seek to overcome limited evangelical and process understandings by drawing upon resources within each tradition. The other two essays suggest adding voices to the discussion that have not been heard clearly previously.

Adding additional positions to the discussion between process and evangelical theologians may stimulate developments within each tradition. Postmodern philosophy relates to both evangelicals and process thinkers while differing with each of them. Comparing the thought of a representative from each group brings recognition of the agreement that absolute knowledge is not available to humans but significant differences arise about what is known about God. Comparison also shows a common identification of newness or novelty with God. However, disagreement arises about the (...) nature of divine agency. Process theologians are challenged to draw upon the resources of process theology to show more clearly how God’s influence, as pervasive and continuing, supports hope. Evangelical theologians are challenged to relate divine and human action more consistently. Both evangelical and process theologians are encouraged to recognize the limitation of their own conceptual structures. (shrink)

I respond to H. M. Collins's claim (1985, 1990, 1993) that experimental inquiry cannot be objective because the only criterium experimentalists have for determining whether a technique is "working" is the production of "correct" (i.e., the expected) data. Collins claims that the "experimenters' regress," the name he gives to this data-technique circle, cannot be broken using the resources of experiment alone. I argue that the data-technique circle, can be broken even though any interpretation of the raw data produced by techniques (...) is theory-dependent. However, it is possible to break this circle by eliminating dependence on even those theoretical presuppositions that are shared by an entire scientific community through the use of multiple independently theory-dependent techniques to produce robust bodies of data. Moreover, I argue, that it is the production of robust bodies of data that convinces experimentalists of the objectivity of their data interpretations. (shrink)

Shmuel Nili’s Philosophizing The Indefensible – Strategic Political Theory represents a sophisticated response to the widespread support of political positions that seem unreasonable from the perspective of liberal political morality. Nili takes seriously extreme right-wing, pro-life, pro-business, and climate change-sceptic positions that other liberal theorists seem to prefer sweeping under the carpet when turning towards yet another puzzle of liberalism. This is a refreshing move, which Nili pursues masterfully through the critical analysis of such seemingly indefensible positions in painstaking detail. (...) That said, readers who are intrigued by the political philosophical methods of Charles Larmore and the late John Rawls, who accept the fact of reasonable moral disagreement and focus primarily on the question of political legitimacy, may sometimes find that Nili’s argumentations are somewhat moralistic. (shrink)

John Rawls wurde 1921 in Baltimore im Bundesstaat Maryland als zweiter von fünf Söhnen geboren. Nach dem Besuch einer privaten und einer öffentlichen Schule in Baltimore wechselte Rawls an die religiöse Kent School im Bundesstaat Connecticut. Wie sein älterer Bruder Bill studierte Rawls in Princeton, wo er 1943 sein Studium mit einem Bachelor of Arts abschloss. In seiner Senior Thesis Über Sünde, Glaube und Religion beschäftigte sich der zu dieser Zeit streng religiöse Rawls mit dem Problem des Bösen, auf (...) das er durch Veranstaltungen von Norman Malcom gebracht wurde. (shrink)

In this article I argue that G.A. Cohen is mistaken in his belief that the concept of justice needs to be rescued from constructivist theorists of justice. In doing so, I rely on insights of John Rawls’ later work Political Liberalism and Rainer Forst’s discourse theory of justice. Such critical engagement with Cohen’s critique of constructivism is needed, because Cohen bases his critique of constructivism almost exclusively on Rawls’s arguments and positions in A Theory of Justice. He thus neglects (...) - at least by and large - that Rawls had further developed his constructivist method of justification in his later work Political Liberalism, as well as that Forst’s discourse-theoretical works offer elaborate versions of constructivism. These refined versions of constructivism recognize a plurality of reasonable conceptions of ideal justice and draw an important distinction between moral and political constructivism. Because of these features these advanced constructivist theories are not in need of Cohen’s rescue. (shrink)

When asking fundamental questions about education, philosophers have not shied away from giving radical answers. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for example, who found himself disenchanted with the artificiality and pride that he encountered in 18th century Paris, advocated a laissez faire education in the countryside. Such an “education by nature,” Rousseau thought, would keep children at bay from morally corrupt society and would allow them to become authentic and sincere persons. Similarly concerned with moral education, in the early 20th century the American (...) pragmatist John Dewey argued that experiential learning in socially diverse settings would be crucial for nourishing democratic culture. Being a pragmatist, Dewey also maintained that educational philosophy should always concentrate on solving practical difficulties of contemporary social life, instead of dealing with idle intellectual puzzles. In this spirit, oriented towards educational practice, several philosophers of education and educational theorists have recently turned their attention to the ways in which education might help solving some of the pressing problems arising from globalization. This special issue of Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric assembles the latest scholarship of some these philosophers and theorists on the topic of “Global Justice and Education” – a topic which until recently has been curiously neglected within the academic literature on global justice. Alejandra Boni (Technical University of Valencia) and Diana Carolina Velasco (University of Ibagué) analyze how power asymmetries in global knowledge production can give rise to epistemic injustices and explored how academics can collaborate with civil society actors to fight such injustices. Johannes Drerup (Technical University of Dortmund and Free University Amsterdam) responds to the postcolonial critique that global citizenship education is Western-centric by arguing that the dichotomy of “the West vs. the Rest” is outdated and that the critical study of colonialism should be part of global citizenship education. Juan Espíndola (National Autonomous University of Mexico) criticizes that low fee private schools in many developing countries often times do not provide an adequate education, and that global philanthropists should therefore be more careful in their support for these schools. Lindsey Schwartz (University of Wisconsin-Madison) discusses a number of problems that students living abroad face because two central principles of educational justice that are usually taken for granted at the national level either systematically overlook or exacerbate their problems. These two principles are the principle of educational adequacy and the presumption of responsibility on the part of a host country for meeting children’s educational needs. Due to their inappropriateness under conditions of globalization and, in particular, transnational migration, Schwartz demands a cosmopolitan revision of the first and a replacement for the second with a focus on collective responsibility. Finally, Danielle Zwarthoed (Catholic University of Louvain) critically examines the proposal that education for autonomy could be conceived of as a global educational aim, and points out that not only do non-Western cultures endorse the ideal of autonomy, but also that autonomy increasingly gains practical value in a world in which mobility is ubiquitous. -/- All paper drafts except that of Lindsey Schwartz have been subject to intensive debate during the two-day international workshop on “Global Justice In and Through Education,” held at the American University of Paris (AUP) on November 29 and 30, 2018. The international workshop was hosted by the Center for Critical Democracy Studies (CCDS) and was generously funded not only from the CCDS but also from the German Research Foundation (DFG). (shrink)

Lyotard defines being postmodern as an ‘incredulity toward metanarratives’. Such incredulity includes, in particular, skepticism vis-à-vis Enlightenment ideals like autonomy. Motivated by such skepticism, several educational scholars put into question education for autonomy as it is practiced in the formal settings of national school systems. More specifically, they criticize that practices of autonomy education can have certain normalizing and ideological e￿ects that undermine the aim of creating autonomous subjects. This article examines these critiques of education for autonomy and argues that (...) they are best understood as calls for reforming educational practices, and not as outright rejections of education for autonomy. Thus, since the allegedly ‘postmodern’ critiques of autonomy education cannot be plausibly understood as radical ruptures with Enlightenment ideals, the article concludes that these critiques represent (merely) constructive self-critical reflections on what Habermas dubbed the ‘unfinished project of modernity’. (shrink)

The actual uses of the concept of justice in social and political conflicts refer to a variety of different understandings of justice. These different understandings include fair cooperation, equality of opportunity for welfare and justified coercion. In this paper I will argue, however, that at a more fundamental level the core meaning of social or political justice – its universal grammar, so to speak – is that of justifiable rule. This means that a social or political order can only be (...) deemed just if it is justifiable to those who are subject to that order. The paper will further explain this universal grammar of justice by way of identifying the ways in which it is connected to a justification-based conception of moral respect. In conclusion, the paper will defend this understanding of social or political justice as justifiable rule against the critique that it is parochial or Western-centric. (shrink)

This article will show that the work of international development organizations requires a constant reflection of the moral and political philosophical kind. A major reason for this is that while people agree that the abstract concept of development, in its normative usage, indeed, simply means social progress or good, or desirable, social change, they disagree profoundly about what social progress consists in exactly. There exists a normative disagreement about the conception of development that expresses best how social progress ought to (...) be defined in concrete terms. For example, should we really think of social progress only in terms of economic growth, i.e. in the accumulation of goods and services? Or should we instead, for example, think of it in terms of the eradication of extreme poverty? Or in terms of yet something else, like the expansion of options for human choice? (shrink)

Thomas Pogge absolvierte ein Ph.D.-Programm in Philosophie an der Harvard University und wurde dort von John Rawls betreut. Seine Dissertation argumentierte für die Extension Rawls’ Gerechtigkeitstheorie auf globale Verhältnisse. Pogges globale Gerechtigkeitstheorie betrachtet weltweite sozioökonomische Armut als strukturelles Problem für das insbesondere reiche Länder und deren Regierungen verantwortlich sind. In der Ausarbeitung seiner eigenen, politisch-liberalen Theorie internationaler Gerechtigkeit kritisierte Rawls Pogges Auffassung globaler Gerechtigkeit. Pogge wiederum hat in methodologischen Debatten Rawls’ politische Philosophie für deren Fokus auf die Grundstruktur und (...) Grundgüter verteidigt. (shrink)

The practice-independent approach to theorizing justice holds that the social practices to which a particular conception of justice is meant to apply are of no importance for the justification of such a conception. In this paper I argue that this approach to theorizing justice is incompatible with the method of reflective equilibrium because the MRE is antithetical to a clean separation between issues of justification and application. In particular I will be maintaining that this incompatibility renders Simon Caney’s cosmopolitan theory (...) of global justice inconsistent, because Caney claims to endorse both a humanity-centered PIA and the MRE. (shrink)

Rising powers like India and Brazil have recently been gaining considerable economic and political power. This has led to the emergence of a nascent multipolarity in global affairs. Theorists of global distributive justice, however, continue to focus almost exclusively on the responsibility of the established powers for combating global poverty and neglect whether there is a similar responsibility of rising powers. That focus neglects that great shifts have occurred in the distribution of the economically severely poor over the past three (...) decades. According to recent work by Andy Sumner, 74% of those who live in extreme economic poverty resided in middle-income countries in 2008. This paper explores this lacuna and shows that there are several grounds for attributing a similar responsibility to rising powers. These grounds are familiar from discussions of the established powers' responsibility for global distributive injustice in the writings of John Rawls, Peter Singer and Thomas Pogge. They are the capa.. (shrink)

Die Staatsform einer konstitutionellen Demokratie ist von zentraler Bedeutung für John Rawls’ Gerechtigkeitstheorie. Sie stellt das grundlegendste, rechtlich verfasste Institutionensystem einer Gesellschaft dar, welches Bürger*innen gleiche Grundfreiheiten ermöglichen soll, einschließlich der hierfür erforderlichen kulturellen, ökonomischen und sozialen Voraussetzungen. Diese Form der Demokratie soll die wichtigsten institutionellen Anforderungen Rawls’ liberal-egalitärer Auffassung binnenstaatlicher Gerechtigkeit verwirklichen.

This chapter develops and discusses a Deweyan perspective on the contemporary difficulties of deliberation within the highly fragmented digitized public spheres of liberal democracies. A high level of fragmentation is a key feature of digitized public spheres, as digital technologies like computers, the internet, and social media platforms facilitate the creation of political content, the circumvention of traditional gatekeepers like journalists, and the personalization of access to political debates. As a result, democratic theorists are concerned that the digitized public spheres (...) are insufficiently inclusive for identifying public opinions that are generally. The Deweyan perspective developed in this chapter adds new insights into the existing analyses of political deliberation by emphasizing the importance of a well- functioning democracy for citizens’ lifelong education, as well as by highlighting the impact of cultural transformations on liberal democracy. However, despite the valuable insights that can be generated by the Deweyan perspective, this article also criticizes it for failing to deal adequately with the unavoidable pluralism of reasonable understandings of the good life in a liberal democracy. The chapter therefore also seeks to evaluate to what extent, if at all, the Deweyan insights can be taken up as well by a political liberal perspective that seeks to accommodate this pluralism. (shrink)

Meyer and Sanklecha's elaborate article1 addresses an issue of practical importance for all of us who are living in highly industrialized countries, and who are formulating or revising our life plans and long-term projects. It examines whether the expectation of people living in highly industrialized countries to be able to continue to emit greenhouse gases at their current average level in the future (Expectation E) is epistemically and politically legitimate, and morally permissible. Such an investigation is directly relevant for any (...) formulation or revision of a life plan or long-term project, since any such plan or project should take into consideration whether it is accessible both from an empirical and from a normative point of view. Thus, as many potential life plans and long-term projects are based upon Expectation E, people living in highly industrialized countries must determine whether Expectation E is realistically achievable and consistent with relevant normative standards. For if Expectation E turned out to be either epistemically illegitimate, politically illegitimate, or morally impermissible, then certainly prima facie people living in highly industrialized countries would have good reason to formulate and revise their life plans and long-term projects in such a way that these would avoid being based upon Expectation E. Therein lies the crucial practical import of Meyer and Sanklecha's article. This comment engages with two aspects of Meyer and Sanklecha's relatively brief discussion of the political legitimacy of Expectation E and leaves aside for the most part their analyses of the epistemic legitimacy and moral permissibility of Expectation E. (shrink)

_A new theory of how and why we cooperate, drawing from economics, political theory, and philosophy to challenge the conventional wisdom of game theory_ Game theory explains competitive behavior by working from the premise that people are self-interested. People don’t just compete, however; they also cooperate. John Roemer argues that attempts by orthodox game theorists to account for cooperation leave much to be desired. Unlike competing players, cooperating players take those actions that they would like others to take—which Roemer (...) calls “Kantian optimization.” Through rigorous reasoning and modeling, Roemer demonstrates a simpler theory of cooperative behavior than the standard model provides. (shrink)

This article summarizes a variety of current as well as previous research in support of a new theory of consciousness. Evidence has been steadily accumulating that information about a stimulus complex is distributed to many neuronal populations dispersed throughout the brain and is represented by the departure from randomness of the temporal pattern of neural discharges within these large ensembles. Zero phase lag synchronization occurs between discharges of neurons in different brain regions and is enhanced by presentation of stimuli. This (...) evidence further suggests that spatiotemporal patterns of coherence, which have been identified by spatial principal component analysis, may encode a multidimensional representation of a present or past event. How such distributed information is integrated into a holistic percept constitutes the binding problem. How a percept defined by a spatial distribution of nonrandomness can be subjectively experienced constitutes the problem of consciousness. Explanations based on a discrete connectionistic network cannot be reconciled with the relevant facts. Evidence is presented herein of invariant features of brain electrical activity found to change reversibly with loss and return of consciousness in a study of 176 patients anesthetized during surgical procedures. A review of relevant research areas, as well as the anesthesia data, leads to a postulation that consciousness is a property of quantumlike processes, within a brain field resonating within a core of structures, which may be the neural substrate of consciousness. This core includes regions of the prefrontal cortex, the frontal cortex, the pre- and paracentral cortex, thalamus, limbic system, and basal ganglia. (shrink)

This book, first published in 1990, takes a critical look at the major assumptions which support critical thinking programs and discovers many unresolved questions which threaten their viability. John McPeck argues that some of these assumptions are incoherent or run counter to common sense, while others are unsupported by the available empirical evidence. This title will be of interest to students of the philosophy of education.

This review of Martin Jay’s recent published collection of essays examines his ongoing rethinking, supplementation, and revision of central themes—the negative and positive dialectics of historical totalization, the varieties and uses of conceptions of experience, the nature of visual cultures and scopic regimes, and the ambiguities of truth-construction in the public realm—that have been the focus of his major works since the 1970s. It argues that his more recent work indicates a gradual shift toward an affirmation of the kinds of (...) paratactic and deconstructive thinking of Adorno and Derrida as models for producing appropriate forms of historical consciousness and historical critique in the present, and it raises the question of how the issues of historical truth-telling, consensual collective identity, ethical action, and the cultural role of the critical intellectual are reformulated in this process. (shrink)

Is morality too difficult for human beings? Kant said that it was, except with God's assistance. Contemporary moral philosophers have usually discussed the question without reference to Christian doctrine, and have either diminished the moral demand, exaggerated human moral capacity, or tried to find a substitute in nature for God's assistance. This book looks at these philosophers--from Kant and Kierkegaard to Swinburne, Russell, and R.M. Hare--and the alternative in Christianity.

If one is an egalitarian, what should one want to equalize? Opportunities or outcomes? Resources or welfare? These positions are usually conceived to be very different. I argue in this paper that the distinction is misconceived: the only coherent conception of resource equality implies welfare equality, in an appropriately abstract description of the problem. In this section, I motivate the program which the rest of the paper carries out.

Introduction Marxism is a set of ideas from which sprang particular approaches to economics, sociology, anthropology, political theory, literature, art, ...

In the first comprehensive biography of Ferdinand de Saussure, John E. Joseph restores the full character and history of a man who is considered the founder of modern linguistics and whose ideas have influenced literary theory, philosophy, cultural studies, and virtually every other branch of humanities and the social sciences.

The evolution of life on Earth has produced an organism that is beginning to model and understand its own evolution and the possible future evolution of life in the universe. These models and associated evidence show that evolution on Earth has a trajectory. The scale over which living processes are organized cooperatively has increased progressively, as has its evolvability. Recent theoretical advances raise the possibility that this trajectory is itself part of a wider developmental process. According to these theories, the (...) developmental process has been shaped by a yet larger evolutionary dynamic that involves the reproduction of universes. This evolutionary dynamic has tuned the key parameters of the universe to increase the likelihood that life will emerge and produce outcomes that are successful in the larger process (e.g. a key outcome may be to produce life and intelligence that intentionally reproduces the universe and tunes the parameters of ‘offspring’ universes). Theory suggests that when life emerges on a planet, it moves along this trajectory of its own accord. However, at a particular point evolution will continue to advance only if organisms emerge that decide to advance the developmental process intentionally. The organisms must be prepared to make this commitment even though the ultimate nature and destination of the process is uncertain, and may forever remain unknown. Organisms that complete this transition to intentional evolution will drive the further development of life and intelligence in the universe. Humanity’s increasing understanding of the evolution of life in the universe is rapidly bringing it to the threshold of this major evolutionary transition. (shrink)

In these previously uncollected essays, Smith argues that American philosophers like Peirce, James, Royce, and Dewey have forged a unique philosophical tradition—one that is rich and complex enough to represent a genuine alternative to the analytic, phenomenological, and hermeneutical traditions which have originated in Britain or Europe. "In my judgment, John Smith has no equal today in combining two scholarly qualities: the analysis of philosophical texts with penetration and rigor, and the discernment of what it is in these texts (...) that matters. These qualities are in evidence throughout the essays in _America's Philosophical Vision._ Whether he is evaluating Rorty's view of Dewey; the pragmatic theory of experience and truth; theories of freedom, creativity, and the self; Royce's conception of community; or synoptic philosophic visions, Smith always succeeds in uniting a comprehensive understanding of philosophic writings with a sure grasp of their import for human culture and aspiration. It is a great benefit to students of American thought that these papers have now been collected into one volume."—James Gouinlock, Emory University. (shrink)

This work is an exploration of divine command theory, which is the theory that what makes something morally obligatory is that God commands it.

Let it be clear at the outset that in reappraising Dewey's thought we have to do with no minute philosopher. In breadth of interest and range of thought he belongs with the great comprehensive thinkers of the past. And in contrast to many thinkers both in his own time and since, he had a constructive program. Philosophy for him meant more than analysis, even though analysis is an important part of the philosophic enterprise. Dewey's constructive philosophy has too often been (...) lost in polemic discussion. I subscribe to the confession made some years ago by Ernest Hocking in which he said that he began to understand Dewey when he started reading him for enjoyment and not for the purpose of showing that he was all wrong! As Dewey's work shapes up in historical perspective, it assumes a great substantiality. One may disagree and one may correct, but in comparison with philosophy of a wholly technical and professional sort, Dewey's large-minded approach to genuinely philosophic questions places him among philosophers of stature. (shrink)

What can we learn from reading Levinas alongside postcolonial theories of difference? With that question in view, Drabinski undertakes readings of Gayatri Spivak, Homi Bhabha, Edouard Glissant, and Subcommandante Marcos in order to rethink ideas of difference, language, subjectivity, ethics, and politics. Through these philosophical readings, he gives a new perspective on the work of these important postcolonial theorists and helps make Levinas relevant to other disciplines concerned with postcolonialism and ethics.

Despite the frivolous note implied in the popular expression, ‘The Greeks had a word for it’, the literal truth is that they did! Time and again we find reflected in the terminology developed by these ancient seekers after wisdom, an attention to important distinctions and a faithfulness to the details of actual experience which are truly remarkable. The Greek thinkers had, as every classical scholar and student of Greek philosophy knows, a finely developed philosophical language, one sensitive no less to (...) the unusual, pregnant experience than to the familiar details of ordinary life. (shrink)